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The Politicisation of the European Central Bank: What is it, and how to study it? 
(Forthcoming in Journal of Common Market Studies) 
 
 
Pier Domenico Tortola 




The euro crisis has spurred a process of transformation in the governance of the Eurozone and 
the European Union (EU) as a whole, which so far has included, among other things, the 
strengthening of common fiscal rules and surveillance, the creation of new crisis management 
institutions and tools, and greater integration in the banking and financial sector. While this 
process is still ongoing, a beneficiary can already be identified: the European Central Bank 
(ECB). For one thing, over the past decade the ECB has considerably expanded its policy 
toolbox to tackle crisis-related problems, both in the financial sector (for example introducing 
Long Term Refinancing Operations and various asset purchase programmes, and relaxing 
collateral requirements for loans to banks), and in the public one, with the creation of such 
lending-of-last-resort instruments as the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and the more recent implementation of quantitative 
easing (QE). For another, the ECB has acquired a more prominent role within the Eurozone’s 
institutional architecture, not just in the area of banking supervision, but also in 
macroeconomic surveillance through its role in the Troika, later formalized within the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).1 
                                                 
1 For more extensive accounts of the ECB’s measures and transformations following the euro crisis see Bastasin 
(2015) and Micossi (2015).  
 More generally, the crisis years have seen the ECB rise to a position of leadership in 
tackling Europe’s economic woes, which has been especially visible under the presidency of 
Mario Draghi. Often more reluctant than sought, this leadership has resulted above all from 
the asymmetrical setup of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which lacks a fiscal 
counterpart—and related institutions—able to provide a credible bulwark against economic 
havoc, and the paucity of proactive initiative on the part of other powerful actors in the Union, 
in the first place Germany. Together, these factors have left the ECB as the one actor 
possessing the institutional ability and wherewithal to help the Eurozone weather the worst 
parts of the crisis, ultimately preventing, in the eyes of many, a breakup of the single currency 
(Schoeller 2018; Tortola and Pansardi 2018; Verdun 2017). 
 The ECB’s actions during the crisis have not remained uncontroversial. Accompanying 
the Bank’s new role within the EU have been mounting claims about its “politicisation”. For 
instance, as the ECB reacted to the impasse on Greece’s third bailout in the summer of 2015 
by blocking Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the country’s banks, economist Jeffrey 
Sachs (2015) commented that the decision, “forced by the ECB’s highly politicised Executive 
Board, will be studied—and scorned—by historians for years to come.” Echoing Sachs, 
Greece’s finance minister Yannis Varoufakis (in Khan and Chan 2015) noted that “[t]he 
attempt to ringfence Frankfurt from politics has produced a highly politicised central bank.” A 
couple of years earlier, and from a different standpoint, German conservative daily Die Welt 
dubbed the ECB’s introduction of the OMT as “the ultimate politicisation of a young central 
bank” (in Smith 2012). Analyst David Marsh (in Jones 2015) later expressed similar concerns 
about the introduction of the QE, with which the ECB “crossed a fateful line into the world of 
full-scale politicisation.” The list could go on. 
 But what, exactly, does it mean for the ECB to have become politicised? What is it, 
more precisely, that makes an ECB decision, instrument or statement a political act?2 Beneath 
the surface of claims like the ones above, the concept of politicisation remains elusive. To be 
sure, some conceptual fuzziness is to be expected in this debate, due to the breadth and 
contested nature of politics as a social sphere, and the multi-faceted character of most ECB 
actions, which makes (alleged) politicisation at least partly dependent on what aspect of a 
certain measure or policy one is looking at. Even so, the conceptual status quo remains 
unsatisfactory considering the importance of the phenomenon of politicisation. This hinders 
the development of a fruitful debate not only analytically, as regards the place, functions and 
possible malfunctions of the ECB within the EU system (and the mechanisms governing 
them), but also normatively, because of the implications of politicisation for the legitimacy of 
the ECB and its policies.  
 To address these problems, this article presents a systematic analysis of the existing 
debate on ECB politicisation, and proposes a strategy for a more robust definition and 
operationalisation of the concept. The article proceeds as follows: the next section reviews 
existing uses of the term politicisation by summarizing them into three dichotomies—
politicisation vs independence, impartiality, and convention—and highlighting their logical 
and empirical limits. To overcome these limits, the third section proposes an alternative, 
preference-based definitional approach, which posits politicisation as a deviation from 
technocratic decision-making in the ECB. Based on this definition, the fourth section presents 
three avenues for future empirical research on politicisation centred, respectively, on elite 
                                                 
2 It should be stated from the outset that in focusing on politicisation as the attribute of an actor and its actions, 
this article leaves out the alternative and equally widespread notion of politicisation as an increase in the public 
salience and contentiousness of an issue (e.g. Calhoun 2002). While these two types of politicisation are 
connected (e.g. de Wilde 2011), they nonetheless remain conceptually distinct—for example, a non-political 
actor can operate within a highly politicized policy area—and should not be confused or conflated with each 
other.   
interviews and surveys, the analysis of central bankers’ networks, and the study of ECB 
language. The fifth section concludes.  
 
What is a politicised ECB? Three dichotomies, and their limitations 
Generally speaking, in political and academic debates on the ECB the term politicisation 
tends to be associated to deviations from some “normal” behaviour to which the Bank is 
expected to conform. In analysing this phenomenon, therefore, it is easier to proceed by 
opposition, starting from the type of normality that the ECB (allegedly) violates. Three 
distinct, yet partly overlapping, dichotomies emerge from the existing debate.3 
 
Dichotomy #1: Politicisation vs independence  
The single main way in which politicisation is discussed in the literature on central banks is 
with respect to the latter’s formal links to governments. In this version a central bank is 
politicised when it is legally subordinated to a country’s majoritarian institutions (usually the 
executive), whose will the bank executes, more or less directly.  
 When it comes to formal independence, the ECB is particularly above suspicion, due to 
the high degree of autonomy ingrained in its legal architecture. De jure independence, 
however, does not eliminate the possibility of informal relationships of dependence, which 
can occur for a number of reasons that transcend the letter of the law. In the ECB case, de 
facto dependence is most likely to materialize with respect to the Bank’s main political 
principals, namely the Eurozone’s member states—or at least the more powerful ones. 
Charles Wyplosz (2015) expresses this idea quite well: 
 
                                                 
3 While many of the illustrations included in the following overview relate to monetary policy—the area in 
which the ECB politicisation debate has developed most visibly—the analysis applies to the whole range of ECB 
activities.  
[o]n paper, the ECB enjoys full independence. Its Board members cannot be revoked and their 
long eight-year mandate cannot be renewed, so that they do not have to please member 
governments. Yet, they reluctantly violated the no-bailout clause to please member governments. 
Then, it took three years to decide on the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Programme – 
which brought immediate relief – because some member governments opposed it. For the same 
reason, they started QE seven years after the Fed, probably contributing to the longest period ever 
of no growth in Europe. 
 
 Taken to the extreme, what Wyplosz describes is a dynamics of total ECB subordination 
to (some) member states. While possible in principle, this type of relationship seems unlikely 
in our case, if nothing else because it is inconsistent with the several cases of monetary policy 
disagreements between the ECB leadership and the German government—arguably the most 
powerful among the Bank’s principals—in which the latter has found itself on the losing side. 
 More probably, who sees ECB politicisation as a deficit of independence has a more 
balanced and nuanced type of relationship in mind, in which the Bank is exposed to political 
pressures on the part of member states, but at the same time retains a significant degree of 
freedom in deciding whether or not to grant “favours” to this or that government as a response 
to such pressures. So defined, this conception of politicization overlaps to a great extent with 
the next dichotomy. 
 
Dichotomy #2: Politicisation vs impartiality 
A second part of the debate on ECB politicisation takes the latter to mean a violation of the 
principle of impartiality, whereby the Bank’s decisions should not generate winners and 
losers. The beneficiaries of this type of politicization can be of different kinds: for instance, 
Genovese, Schneider and Wassmann (2016), attribute a political character to those ECB 
actions, primarily the QE, that have ameliorated the conditions of the most distressed 
segments of the Eurozone population.4 
 Most often, however, the distributive effects of ECB policies are interpreted, again, in 
interstate terms, i.e. benefiting certain countries or governments over others. This is, for 
instance, the case of the OMT, an instrument designed to buy (under conditionality) bonds 
issued by specific countries in order to ease pressures on their budgets and bond markets. As 
Lombardi and Moschella (2016: 863) put it,  
 
[s]ince the programme implied support for sovereign bonds in only a few countries, rather than 
comprehensive support across the euro area as a whole, it politicized those “deep cultural 
differences” that exist within the euro area. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, quantitative easing too is often interpreted along these lines, namely as 
a political decision on the part of the ECB that helps Eurozone’s weaker economies over those 
(usually northern) member states that can do without the QE. 
 Of course, peripheral economies can also be on the losing side of ECB policies. As 
mentioned above, when the ECB suspended ELA to Greece, many saw this as a politicised 
move against Alexis Tsipras’s government. Wren-Lewis (2015), for example, argues that  
 
[l]imiting funding on 28th June was the Greek government’s punishment for failing to agree to 
the Troika's terms and calling a referendum the day before. The ECB was not, and never has 
been, a neutral actor just following the rules of a good central bank. 
 
                                                 
4 This take is consistent with a recent economic study by Lenza and Slacalek (2018), which shows that low 
income households have benefited disproportionately from the ECB’s quantitative easing. 
 Similarly, the Bank’s famous summer 2011 letter to the Italian government, urging the 
latter to implement a number of structural reforms to ensure the sustainability of the country’s 
finances, has been time and again depicted by Silvio Berlusconi and his supporters as a 
political manoeuvre that facilitated Mr Berlusconi’s later removal from power in favour of the 
more EU-friendly Mario Monti (Benvenuti 2017). 
 As intuitive and rhetorically effective the notion of politicisation as partiality is, from a 
conceptual standpoint it is problematic. Even assuming that the distributive consequences of 
the ECB’s actions can always be clearly detected—which is a big if, especially as one 
ventures beyond the short term—the fact remains that, as Fernández-Albertos (2015) notes, 
virtually anything a central bank does has some distributive effects, even though some are 
more tangible than others. So, unless we are ready to argue that the ECB is always politicised, 
partiality does not seem, by itself, a good basis on which to ground the concept. 
 A more viable interpretation of politicisation-as-partiality should then rely not only on 
the effects of the ECB’s decisions but also, and above all, on the motives underpinning them. 
Put differently, the Bank’s actions should not be seen as politicised when they generate 
winners and losers, but when they do so on the basis of a deliberate decision rather than as a 
by-product of economic measures. This more comprehensive view may well be what most of 
those adopting this conception of politicisation have in mind. Yet, the fact that central 
bankers’ intentions are hardly ever brought to the fore and properly discussed remains a 
problem, as shall be seen more in detail later on.  
 
Dichotomy #3: Politicisation vs convention 
A third version of ECB politicisation associates the latter to deviations from conventional 
policy means and objectives. In a way, this view of politicisation is the mirror image of the 
first: in that case, the ECB’s “pathology” was its scarce independence vis-à-vis its political 
principals; in this, it is the Bank’s expansion of its independence to the point of shirking the 
mission assigned to it by member states, and formulating its own policies in an uncontrolled 
fashion (Elgie 2002).  
 The most obvious way in which the Bank’s conventional boundaries can be defined is 
legally, as the Bank’s price stability mandate (Art. 127(1) TFEU) plus other Treaty rules 
delimiting its scope of action, most notably the “no bailout” clause (Art. 125 TFEU). 
Commenting on the reception of the ECB’s Securities Market Programme (SMP) in Germany, 
for instance, Högenauer and Howarth (2016: 12) argue that “[t]he diversion from the pursuit 
of low inflation thus, in itself, politicised ECB monetary policy for a large section of the 
German political class and public.” 
 In principle, seeing politicisation as the violation of the ECB’s mandate is plausible: if 
the Bank transcends the perimeter set by its political creators, then it must, by definition, be 
following some other ultimate goals which it has, more or less deliberately, set autonomously. 
The limits of this view, however, are empirical. Identifying politicisation as mandate violation 
makes its detection a matter of legal interpretation of the mandate itself; and so far it is at least 
questionable whether any such violation has in fact happened. As Sester (2012) and Beukers 
(2013), among others, have argued, even controversial measures such as the OMT and its 
predecessor SMP can be seen as fully within the ECB’s legal boundaries. More authoritative 
confirmations of this position have come from the European Court of Justice, most notably 
through its approval of the OMT (Case C‑62/14 - Peter Gauweiler and Others V Deutscher 
Bundestag) and, more recently, the QE (Case C-493/17 - Heinrich Weiss and Others). 
 There is a broader way in which politicisation-as-unconventionality can be defined, 
namely with reference to some set of policy measures generally accepted as the ECB’s 
standard repertoire. Discussing the OMT, Scicluna (2014: 568) writes that: 
 
[g]iven that there is no consensus about what ought to be done to resolve the crisis and billions of 
euros riding on the outcome, it cannot plausibly be argued that the ECB has simply selected the 
“best” policy option in an objective or technocratic manner. Right or wrong, it is a profoundly 
political decision. 
 
 Similarly to the case of politicisation-as-partiality discussed above, this version of 
politicisation is appealing prima facie, yet unconvincing at a closer look. Once legal aspects 
are removed from the notion of policy convention, there is no apparent reason why violations 
of the latter should, by themselves, make the ECB more political. In fact, breaking with 
convention may well be seen as a way for the Bank to better fulfil its legal mission (e.g. 
Drudi, Durré and Mongelli 2012). Moreover, if followed to its logical consequences, the 
notion of politicisation-as-unconventionality runs into paradoxical results, for what is new 
policy today will, if sustained, eventually enter the baseline against which to measure 
tomorrow’s politicisation. 
 Finally, and more tangibly, seeing the breaking of new policy ground as an inherently 
political act sits uncomfortably with the language of the ECB itself, which refers to many of 
its anti-crisis measures as “non-standard” while routinely and categorically rejecting all 
claims of its politicisation. All considered it seems, once again, that while unconventionality 
may be, in some cases, a symptom of politicisation, it cannot define the phenomenon isolated 
from some consideration of what the intentions behind a given policy are. 
 
A preference-based approach to politicisation 
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the notion of politicisation is currently associated 
with three characteristics of the ECB and its actions—namely departures from independence, 
impartiality, and policy convention—each of which provides some insight into the 
phenomenon, but cannot be a solid basis for a definition of politicisation, for logical and/or 
empirical reasons. What is needed in order to exit this conceptual impasse is an alternative 
definitional strategy for ECB politicisation, which can overcome the limits of existing uses of 
the term while at the same time providing some common grounds among them, so as to be 
able to function within and improve on the existing debate. In this section I will argue that for 
such an alternative strategy we should shift our focus to the decision-making preferences of 
central bankers.  
 Similarly to the previous cases, a preference-based approach to politicisation is more 
easily developed by contrast, namely by first asking ourselves what non-political policy-
making looks like. The answer is technocracy. The latter is most commonly defined as rule by 
experts. What is implied, but often overlooked in this definition is that experts rule by 
expertise, i.e. by rationally applying their knowledge (acquired by study and/or practice) to a 
certain area, in order to find optimal solutions to policy problems. To understand why 
technocracy is a depoliticised mode of decision-making we should contrast it to the notion of 
politics as “the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated” 
(Crick 1962, 16-17). While political decisions entail the application of, and compromises 
among, competing views about society’s values and priorities, technocracy ignores, in 
principle, partisan positions and their balance of power, to base its decisions instead on the 
state of the art in the relevant field of knowledge.  
 While inherently distinct from it, technocracy has a fundamental connection with the 
realm of politics, because it can only exist in a space between full and no autonomy vis-à-vis 
political forces and the majoritarian institutions through which they operate. On the one hand, 
technocrats need a nontrivial degree of autonomy from politics in order to have decision-
making room for maneuver. On the other hand, however, in and of themselves knowledge and 
rationality can only guide policy-making within the confines of broader societal goals—a 
mandate—which must be set politically. To phrase it like Sartori (1987, 423), “[a] 
government of experts is admissible in regard to means, not ends.”  
 It is exactly by moving away from this space, de jure or de facto, that technocracy 
becomes politicised. More precisely, politicisation can come in two forms (or a combination 
thereof): if technocrats lose autonomy with respect to politics, or if they acquire full 
independence from it. In the former case, technocrats stop deciding according expertise to 
start doing the bidding of some dominant partisan actor (at the extreme becoming mere 
administrators of political decisions). In the latter, they transcend their political mandate to 
replace it, more or less explicitly, with policy goals set autonomously, ultimately turning 
themselves into partisan players furthering their own views of the “good society”.  
 Formally, the ECB is well placed as a technocratic actor: it has a rather clear mandate 
defining its goals and range of action, and within that mandate it enjoys ample autonomy to 
make policy guided by (macro)economic reasoning and undisturbed by partisan political 
pressures. As explained, however, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
technocracy: within this legal framework, the ECB can still deviate from technocratic policy-
making and become politicised in the two directions described above, that is if its decisions 
are determined primarily by the desire to favour some states or other socio-political actors 
(whether under pressure or by its own volition), and/or if it pursues objectives other than its 
mandate. In either case, ECB decision-making ceases to be driven by techno-scientific 
considerations and starts following preferences and motivations situated in the realm of 
partisan politics. 
 Defining ECB politicisation in terms of policy-making preferences increases both the 
coherence and the quality of political as well as academic discussions on the topic. The 
concept proposed here can be plugged into all three sides of the existing debate and overcome 
the shortcomings of their corresponding conceptualisations, thus making the distinction 
between what is politicised and what is not both clearer and sounder. So, for example, a non-
standard measure by the ECB should not be deemed politicised just because unconventional, 
but only if its motivations transcend the Bank’s mandate. (In fact, if so motivated, even a 
prima facie conventional policy is to be considered politicised under a preference-based 
approach). In a similar vein, policies with clearly distributive effects should not be judged as 
politicised just by virtue of their outcome, but rather based on whether helping certain socio-
political actors has superseded macroeconomic reasoning as the Bank’s guiding principle.  
 Adopting a preference-based approach to ECB politicisation is, of course, not without 
its issues. The concept’s empirical operationalisation, in particular, presents two orders of 
challenges. The first relates to the complexity of the ECB, and the Eurosystem more 
generally, as decision-making systems whose interconnected parts may all be, potentially, loci 
of politicised preferences. While this complicates the study of politicisation it is by no means 
an unsurmountable problem. It rather calls for analytical flexibility on the part of the 
researcher, and the ability to make case-by-case decisions on whether politicisation (or lack 
thereof) is most appropriately investigated at the apex of the ECB (the Executive Board and 
Governing Council) or somewhere else in its decision-making chain. 
 The second challenge regards the intangible nature of preferences, which sets quite a 
high bar for their empirical observation—more so since relevant actors might have a strategic 
incentive to conceal or misrepresent their true policy-making motivations. Although this type 
of problem may never be eradicated in its entirety, there exist a number of research strategies 
that can go a long way towards gauging the preferences of ECB policy-makers, so 
substantiating politicisation in a meaningful way. The next section examines the most 
prominent among these strategies.  
 
Taking central bankers’ preferences seriously: A three-pronged research agenda 
While research on the ECB policy-making has expanded in recent years, the study of bankers’ 
preferences—let alone political ones—is still a minority endeavour within this literature. 
Within existing scholarship, however, three strands can be identified that have tackled, more 
or less explicitly, the question of ECB politicisation building on distinct methodological tools. 
Taken together, they can be seen as the embryo of a promising research programme on which 
to expand for the future.  
 
Gauging preferences directly 
The most straightforward way to assess the politicisation of the ECB is to attack the problem 
directly through surveys and interviews of the Bank’s personnel. In-depth elite interviews, in 
particular, can be very effective not only as a tool for appraising central bankers’ preferences, 
but also as a source of oral policy-making history (Tansey 2007). This is especially important 
in our case given the ECB’s tight policy on internal documents access.5 
 Probably the most extensive attempt to date to examine preferences within the ECB 
through (among other things) elite interviews is Kaltenthaler’s (2006) study of the 
mechanisms and dynamics of ECB policy-making. Kaltenthaler discusses issues connected to 
politicisation particularly in a section devoted to the Bank’s relationships with its socio-
political environment, in which he rules out, based also on conversations with top ECB 
officials, the presence of systematic deviations from technocratic decision-making principles.  
 In a more recent reconstruction of the interactions between the ECB and Eurozone 
member states during the crisis, Henning (2015) presents a more nuanced view on 
politicisation. In dealing with the Greek debt problem, for instance, ECB president Jean-
                                                 
5 While the ECB has become generally more transparent in recent years (for instance by increasing the frequency 
of its hearings before the European Parliament), it continues to follow a 30-year rule for the archival release of 
its records. During that term, applications can be filed to access specific documents, subject to a number of 
exceptions set by the Bank. Contrast this, for instance, with the Fed’s policy of publishing complete transcripts 
of its Federal Open Market Committee with a five year lag. 
Claude Trichet defended the Bank’s independence adamantly in the face of French pressures 
to implement the SMP before the creation of a lending facility. On the other hand, as it sent its 
summer 2011 letter to Italy, the ECB leadership acted fully aware that its actions could be 
regarded as an unduly intrusion into the country’s domestic matters.  
 Schoeller (2018) reaches similarly mixed conclusions in his account of the creation of 
the OMT. While this instruments was generally viewed, inside the ECB, as instrumental to 
restore the Bank’s ability to influence price stability, some of the more fine-grained rationale 
provided by the interviewees—above all the OMT’s strong conditionality to influence 
recipients’ economic policies—were much more dubious as regards their consistency with the 
ECB mandate.  
 The literature just mentioned exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of elite 
interviews and surveys. On the one hand, these are very flexible tools, which can be targeted 
at different parts of the ECB’s hierarchy, and tailored to study broad policy-making dynamics 
as well as more circumscribed events. On the other hand, surveys and interviews pose a 
problem of access to policy-makers and are time consuming methods. Both aspects limit the 
amount of material and the number of observations on which this type of empirical work can 
be based.  
 By far the most important issue with these methods, however, concerns the researcher’s 
ability to obtain truthful and reliable information from them. More so in research on 
politicisation, a phenomenon usually regarded negatively by central bankers, and which the 
latter therefore have an incentive to downplay or hide altogether, whether in good or bad faith. 
Needless to say, this places particular emphasis on the researcher’s skills in crafting and 
presenting questions. 
 
The role of central bankers’ networks 
A second way to look at central bankers’ policy preferences is to infer them from the 
networks to which they belong, based on the assumption that such connections play a major 
role in shaping policy-makers’ ideas and disposition through a mixture of socialisation and 
incentives.  
 Used primarily to look at central bankers’ macroeconomic ideas through their 
intellectual networks, recently this approach has been applied more directly to the question of 
ECB politicisation. A prominent example is Adolph’s (2013) study of the influence of past 
and expected professional connections on central bankers’ monetary policy behaviour. 
Adolph’s argument, tested on 20 central banks and later applied to the ECB, is that central 
bankers can be divided in two groups based on their career trajectories: “financial types” and 
“government types.” Socialization patterns and material incentives produced by their 
respective networks lead the former to prefer hawkish monetary policies that benefit the 
financial sector, and the latter to please governments by choosing more expansionary 
measures.  
 Working from a different angle, Ennser-Jedenastik (2014) analyses politicisation as a 
result of central bankers’ connections with political parties. Examining 30 central banks 
(among whom members of the European System of Central Banks) from 1945 to 2012, he 
concludes, among other things, that the existence of links between a central bank governor 
and a governmental party increases the former’s survival in office, as a consequence of his 
greater responsiveness to governmental policy wishes.  
 Studying ECB politicisation through networks solves some of the problems presented 
by elite interviews and surveys, for the empirical material employed in this case—in the first 
place information on bankers’ professional links—is more readily available, easily quantified 
and produced without the participation of the subjects studied. The nature and availability of 
network-based evidence also increases the analytical breadth of this approach, allowing for 
extensive cross-sectional and/or longitudinal studies of the sort just described. 
 On the cons side, gauging preferences via networks obviously moves the 
operationalisation of politicisation some steps away from its main locus, which in turn may 
affect the validity of the evidence. The biggest shortcoming of the network approach, 
however, relates to the rigidity of the data used, which works well for studying patterns of 
policy preferences over extended stretches of time, but much less so—if at all—for the 
analysis of politicisation (and variations thereof) in shorter periods or single episodes, during 
which bankers’ networks are unlikely to vary much.  
 
Language as an indicator of preferences 
A final strategy to study ECB politicisation relies on language as an indicator of this 
phenomenon. This approach is adjacent to the first—interpreting interviews is, in a way, a 
form of linguistic analysis—but distinct from it because of its more direct focus on text as an 
object of study and, above all, its use of corpora (speeches, press releases, official documents, 
media interviews, etc.) produced independently of the researcher.  
 Unlike economists, who have by now an established tradition of analysing central bank 
communication (especially with respect to its hawkish or dovish content) and its effects on 
financial markets, political scientists, and especially ECB scholars, have come to the study of 
central banks’ language only quite recently, but with some interesting results. Examining the 
ECB president’s speeches and press conferences in the euro crisis peak years, for instance, 
Schmidt (2016) detects a shift, under Mario Draghi’s presidency, from a discourse of 
credibility to one of stability. This was symptomatic of an expansive reinterpretation 
(bordering on violation) of the Bank’s mandate to legitimise its transformation into a lender of 
last resort. Along similar lines, Tortola and Pansardi (2018) analyse the entire corpus of ECB 
presidential speeches to show an increase in charismatic rhetoric as a result of the crisis, 
which in turn suggests the Bank’s performance of political leadership within the EU beyond 
the boundaries of technocracy.  
 Looking more closely into the ECB’s decision-making mechanisms, Bennani (2012; 
2015) examines reported statements by Eurozone central bank governors and the ECB 
president to identify their preferences and policy priorities, and aggregate them through a 
coalitional analysis of the Governing Council. Finally, Van Esch and De Jong (2017) use 
speeches given by the ECB president and four additional Governing Council members in 
2009-11 to trace their respective cognitive maps vis-à-vis a number of crisis-related topics, 
including ECB independence. They find that national preference patterns were clearly visible 
within the Bank’s top decision-making body, but they did not significantly affect president 
Trichet, who displayed an overall neutral and supranational stance. 
 Methodologically, studying politicisation through language is located somewhere in 
between the two previous approaches. Data plenitude and analytical flexibility are two clear 
advantages of this research avenue, as there is no shortage of text of various kinds to be 
combined and analysed in ways that best fit the analyst’s needs. Language can, for example, 
be used to investigate long term preference trends as well as specific ECB decisions, and be 
processed through a variety of techniques, ranging from the interpretive study of discourse to 
automated and quantitative content analysis.  
 On the downside, while language is arguably a closer proxy for preferences than 
bankers’ networks, it remains an indirect, and therefore potentially less accurate way to assess 
politicisation than interviews and surveys. In addition, because language is, among other 
things, the primary way in which the ECB presents itself publicly, in certain cases this 
approach may present the same truthfulness issues as interviews, and ultimately a similar risk 
of underestimating the Bank’s politicisation. 
 
Conclusion 
The politicisation of the ECB is a central and recurrent topic in debates on the European 
Union after the crisis, yet one that still suffers from a considerable degree of conceptual 
vagueness. This article has brought some order within the theme of ECB politicisation by 
mapping and appraising existing uses of this term, proposing a better alternative based on 
central bankers’ policy-making preferences, and finally indicating three strategies for the 
operationalisation of politicisation based on, respectively, elite interviews and surveys, the 
analysis of central bankers’ networks, and the study of ECB language. Using these 
methodological tools intelligently—that is remaining fully aware of their possibilities and 
limits—can take us a long way towards discussing the topic of ECB politicisation with the 
clarity it deserves. 
 While this study has focused primarily on the definition and detection of politicisation, a 
few concluding remarks can be made about possible research avenues to be built on the 
preference-based approach proposed here. Three such avenues, in particular, seem both 
salient and underrepresented in the emerging research programme described above. The first 
is a closer and critical analysis of the relationship between crisis and politicisation. Further 
research should keep problematizing this connection not only, as already suggested here, by 
checking the veracity of ECB politicisation where it has been mostly assumed in recent years, 
but also, and conversely, by investigating the extent to which politicisation should be seen as 
a phenomenon emerging predominantly in times of economic and institutional crisis. This 
question could lead to interesting research into the existence of politicised policy-making by 
the ECB before the euro crisis, as well as its possible persistence after it, as Eurozone 
economies gradually return to normal times.  
 Connected to these questions, the preference-based approach described in this article 
could also be taken as a starting point for more fine-grained inquiries into the nature of ECB 
politicisation than conducted here. Key questions are, for example, what particular set of 
societal and political goals may be factored in policy deliberations by central bankers; which 
constituencies and stakeholders may be de facto prioritised in ECB decision-making behind 
the veil of formal neutrality; and whether all these politicisation dynamics, if detected, vary 
across components of the Eurosystem.  
 Finally, more attention should be devoted to the normative questions raised by the 
possible politicisation of the ECB. One particularly salient aspect in this area concerns the 
legitimacy dilemmas that may arise during certain junctures between the ECB’s duty to 
operate in a fully depoliticised and mandate-bound fashion and its pursuit of objectives that, 
while not strictly speaking part of its remit, may nonetheless have high political importance, 




Adolph, C. (2013) Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bastasin, C. (2015) Saving Europe: Anatomy of a Dream, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Bennani, H. (2012) National Influences inside the ECB: An Assessment from Central 
Bankers’ Statements, University of Lille working paper.  
Bennani, H. (2015) ‘The Euro Area, a Stressful Monetary Union? Learning from Newspapers’ 
Monetary Policy Coverage’, Journal of Economic Issues 49(4): 1008–27. 
Benvenuti, A. (2017) ‘Between Myth and Reality: The Euro Crisis and the Downfall of Silvio 
Berlusconi’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 22(4): 512–29. 
Beukers, T. (2013). ‘The New ECB and Its Relationship with the Eurozone Member States: 
Between Central Bank Independence and Central Bank Intervention’, Common Market 
Law Review 50(6): 1579–620. 
Calhoun, C. (2002) Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Crick, Bernard. 1962. In Defence of Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
De Wilde, P. (2011). “No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the 
Politicization of European Integration’, Journal of European Integration 33(5): 559–75. 
Drudi, F., Durré, A. and Mongelli, F.P. (2012) ‘The Interplay of Economic Reforms and 
Monetary Policy: The Case of the Eurozone’, Journal of Common Market Studies 50(6): 
881–98. 
Elgie, R. (2002) ‘The politics of the European Central Bank: Principal-agent theory and the 
democratic deficit’, Journal of European Public Policy 9(2): 186-200. 
Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2014). ‘Party Politics and the Survival of Central Bank Governors’, 
European Journal of Political Research 53(3): 500–19. 
Fernández-Albertos, J. (2015). ‘The Politics of Central Bank Independence’, Annual Review 
of Political Science 18: 217–37. 
Genovese, F. Schneider, G. and Wassmann, P. (2016) ‘The Eurotower Strikes Back: Crises, 
Adjustments, and Europe’s Austerity Protests’, Comparative Political Studies, 49(7): 
939-67. 
Henning, C.R. (2015) ‘The ECB as a Strategic Actor: Central Banking in a Politically 
Fragmented Monetary Union’, in J.A. Caporaso and M. Rhodes, The Political and 
Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168-
99. 
Högenauer, A.-L. and Howarth, D. (2016) ‘Unconventional Monetary Policies and the 
European Central Bank’s Problematic Democratic Legitimacy’, Journal of Public Law 
17(2): 1–24. 
Jones, C. (2015), ‘ECB Holds Rates Ahead of QE Announcement’, Financial Times, 22 
January 2015. 
Kaltenthaler, K (2006), Policymaking in the European Central Bank: The Masters of 
Europe’s Money, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Khan, M. and Chan, S.P. (2015) ‘European Central Bank Boosts Greek Banks as IMF Default 
Is Averted’, The Telegraph, 9 April 2015. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11526366/European-Central-Bank-
boosts-Greek-banks-as-IMF-default-is-averted.html (accessed 13 March 2018). 
Lenza, M. and Slacalek, J. (2018) How does monetary policy affect income and wealth 
inequality? Evidence from quantitative easing in the euro area, ECB Working Paper 
2190, October. 
Lombardi, D. and Moschella, M. (2016), ‘The Government Bond Buying Programmes of the 
European Central Bank: An Analysis of Their Policy Settings’, Journal of European 
Public Policy 23(6): 851–70. 
Micossi, S. (2015). The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002-2015). Centre 
for European Policy Studies - Special Report 109. May. 
Sachs, J. (2015). “Down and Out in Athens and Brussels’, Project Syndicate, 11 July 2015. 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greek-crisis-economic-governance-
failures-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2015-07?barrier=true (accessed 2 April 2018). 
Sartori, G. (1987). The Theory of Democracy Revisited - Part Two: The Classical Issues. 
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers. 
Schmidt, V.A. (2016) ‘Reinterpreting the Rules ‘by Stealth’ in Times of Crisis: A Discursive 
Institutionalist Analysis of the European Central Bank and the European Commission’, 
West European Politics 39(5): 1032–52. 
Schoeller, M.G. (2018), ‘Leadership by Default: The ECB and the Announcement of Outright 
Monetary Transactions’, Credit and Capital Markets 51(1): 73–91. 
Scicluna, N. (2014), ‘Politicization without Democratization: How the Eurozone Crisis Is 
Transforming EU Law and Politics’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 12(3): 
545–71. 
Sester, P. (2012), ‘The ECB’s Controversial Securities Market Programme (SMP) and Its 
Role in Relation to the Modified EFSF and the Future ESM’, European Company and 
Financial Law Review 9(2): 156–78. 
Smith, D.G. (2012). ‘The ECB Is Doing Governments’ Dirty Work’, Spiegel Online, 7 
September 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/german-press-reactions-to-
ecb-bond-purchase-program-of-mario-draghi-a-854566.html (accessed 3 February 
2018). 
Tansey, O. (2007), ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability 
Sampling’, PS: Political Science and Politics 40(4): 765–72. 
Tortola, P.D. and Pansardi, P. (2018), ‘The Charismatic Leadership of the ECB Presidency: A 
Language-Based Analysis’, European Journal of Political Research, doi: 
10.1111/1475-6765.12272. 
Van Esch, F. and De Jong, E. (2017), ‘National Culture Trumps EU Socialization: The 
European Central Bankers’ Views of the Euro Crisis’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, doi: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1391862. 
Verdun, A. (2017), ‘Political Leadership of the European Central Bank’, Journal of European 
Integration 39(2): 207–21. 
Wren-Lewis, S. (2015), The Non-Independent ECB’, Mainly Macro, 10 July 2015, 
https://mainlymacro.blogspot.nl/2015/07/the-non-independent-ecb.html (accessed 10 
April 2018). 
Wyplosz, C. (2015). ‘Grexit: The Staggering Cost of Central Bank Dependence’ VoxEU, 29 
June 2015, http://voxeu.org/article/grexit-staggering-cost-central-bank-dependence 
(accessed 8 January 2018). 
